Background Increasingly long and complex informed consents have yielded studies demonstrating comparatively low participant understanding and satisfaction with traditional face-to-face approaches. In parallel, interest in electronic consents for clinical and research genomics has steadily increased, yet limited data are available for trio-based genomic discovery studies. We describe the design, development, implementation, and validation of an electronic iConsent application for trio-based genomic research deployed to support genomic studies of cerebral palsy.Methods iConsent development incorporated stakeholder perspectives including researchers, patient advocates, institutional review (...) board members, and genomic data-sharing considerations. The iConsent platform integrated principles derived from prior electronic consenting research and elements of multimedia learning theory. Participant understanding was assessed in an interactive teachback format. The iConsent application achieved nine of ten proposed desiderata for effective patient-focused electronic consenting for genomic research.Results Overall, participants demonstrated high understanding and retention of key human subjects considerations. Enrollees reported high levels of satisfaction with the iConsent, and we found that participant understanding, iConsent clarity, privacy protections, and study goal explanations were associated with overall satisfaction.Conclusions Although opportunities exist to optimize iConsent, we show that such an approach is feasible, can satisfy multiple stakeholder requirements, and can realize high participant satisfaction and understanding while increasing study reach. (shrink)

This particular collaboration with Jim helped me understand more fully the unique role of laboratory experiments vis-a-vis mathematical models in understanding and explaining patterns in nature. My collaboration with Jim began when he invited me to be a member of his doctoral committee at the University of Chicago in Committee on the Conceptual Foundations of Science; this was my first inter-disciplinary doctoral committee. Our collaboration was reinvigorated when several years later Jim elected to conduct a sabbatical in my laboratory. Collaborating (...) with Jim has helped me better understand myself as a research scientist and to understand why some of my best research papers have become nodes in citation networks, connecting theoretical papers on the one hand with those on laboratory experiments and field observations on the other. From very early on, Jim convinced me that evolutionary biologists would be better scientists and do better experiments if they had a better understanding of the history and philosophy of biological science. This conviction spurred me to attend seminars sponsored by the Committee on Conceptual Foundations and to co-teach with Bill Wimsatt at the University of Chicago. It also motivated me to take graduate courses in the history of genetics from Fred Churchill and two graduate courses on the structure and confirmation of evolutionary theory from Elizabeth Lloyd at Indiana University. (shrink)

We’d like to do a little hypnosis on you. Imagine that you’re ensconced in your own family room, your study, or your queen-sized bed. Settling back, you pick up the remote, flick on the TV, and naturally you turn to PBS. This is what you hear:Host 1: Good evening. Welcome to Masterpiece Theatre. Because Alistair Cooke is away on assignment in Alaska, we’ve agreed to host the show tonight, and that’s both a pleasure and a privilege because our program this (...) evening marks the beginning of a fascinating new series, a first on television: Masterpiece Theatre will present you with a docudrama entitled “Masterpiece Theatre.”Host 2: Like “The First Churchills,” this show analyzes the situation of real-life people—tonight, people in the academy. Names have not been changed to protect either the innocent or the guilty, but all the situations are fictive and at times words that may never have been spoken are put into the mouths of people who did not speak them. Other lines, however, are direct quotations from various written sources, although none of the characters, as we depict them, should be confused with any “actual” persons, whether or not those persons would scribe to the idea of their own reality. Like “Upstairs/Downstairs,” this program will introduce you to a spectrum of characters from many walks of life. What’s different about tonight’s episode, though, is that all these characters have passionate opinions about the show itself. Why, the very idea of Masterpiece Theatre drives some of them to Guerrilla Theatre, others to Theatre of the Absurd. Yes, you’ve always already guessed it: we focus tonight on a drama involving what we used to call humanists—now for some a dirty word—and most of our characters are in deep trouble. Sandra M. Gilbert, professor of English at the University of California, Davis, and Susan Gubar, professor of English at Indiana University, are coauthors of No Man’s Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The War of the Words and Volume II: Sexchanges , the first installments of a three-part sequel to their Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination . They have also coedited The Norton Anthology of Literature by Women: The Tradition in English. (shrink)

The recent Supreme Court decision upholding Roe v. Wade and in particular, the dissent by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, sheds new light on the issue of abortion. Let us consider any stage of a pregnancy when abortion is medically safe for the mother. If at that stage it is also medically viable to save the fetus, is an abortion performed at that stage of pregnancy morally justifiable? For example, if it is, or becomes, medically safe to perform abortions (...) after first trimester of pregnancy and at the same time saving a fetus is, or becomes, medically viable or not unusual during some stage of the second trimester, can abortions during and after that stage of pregnancy be justified? With a number of qualifications I shall argue the thesis that as a general rule, but not an absolute rule, abortion in these instances is not usually justifiable. For if it is, then one will also have to grant the moral justification for a number of other highly questionable medical practices. This thesis is not to be identified with the stronger claim that abortions of viable fetuses can never be performed. There are surely exceptions such as when the life or health of the mother is in danger. But, I shall argue, the justification for making such exceptions is on different grounds than is sometimes claimed because one must weigh the health of the mother against the life of another human being. (shrink)

The original essays in this volume, while written from diverse perspectives, share the common aim of building a constructive dialogue between two currents in philosophy that seem not readily allied: Wittgenstein, who urges us to bring our words back home to their ordinary uses, recognizing that it is our agreements in judgments and forms of life that ground intelligibility; and feminist theory, whose task is to articulate a radical critique of what we say, to disrupt precisely those taken-for-granted agreements in (...) judgments and forms of life. Wittgenstein and feminist theorists are alike, however, in being unwilling or unable to "make sense" in the terms of the traditions from which they come, needing to rely on other means—including telling stories about everyday life—to change our ideas of what sense is and of what it is to make it. For both, appeal to grounding is problematic, but the presumed groundedness of particular judgments remains an unavoidable feature of discourse and, as such, in need of understanding. For feminist theory, Wittgenstein suggests responses to the immobilizing tugs between modernist modes of theorizing and postmodern challenges to them. For Wittgenstein, feminist theory suggests responses to those who would turn him into the "normal" philosopher he dreaded becoming, one who offers perhaps unorthodox solutions to recognizable philosophical problems. In addition to an introductory essay by Naomi Scheman, the volume’s twenty chapters are grouped in sections titled "The Subject of Philosophy and the Philosophical Subject," "Wittgensteinian Feminist Philosophy: Contrasting Visions," "Drawing Boundaries: Categories and Kinds," "Being Human: Agents and Subjects," and "Feminism’s Allies: New Players, New Games." These essays give us ways of understanding Wittgenstein and feminist theory that make the alliance a mutually fruitful one, even as they bring to their readings of Wittgenstein an explicitly historical and political perspective that is, at best, implicit in his work. The recent salutary turn in philosophy toward taking history seriously has shown how the apparently timeless problems of supposedly generic subjects arose out of historically specific circumstances. These essays shed light on the task of feminist theorists—along with postcolonial, queer, and critical race theorists—to "rotate the axis of our examination" around whatever "real need[s]" might emerge through the struggles of modernity’s Others. Contributors are Nancy E. Baker, Nalini Bhushan, Jane Braaten, Judith Bradford, Sandra W. Churchill, Daniel Cohen, Tim Craker, Alice Crary, Susan Hekman, Cressida J. Heyes, Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Christine M. Koggel, Bruce Krajewski, Wendy Lynne Lee, Hilda Lindemann Nelson, Deborah Orr, Rupert Read, Phyllis Rooney, and Janet Farrell Smith. (shrink)

Draws on a broad range of scientific evidence to theorize an evolutionary basis for religion, considering how religion may have served as an essential component of early society survival and that the brain may be inherently inclined toward religious behavior.

Pezdek and Lam [Pezdek, K. & Lam, S. . What research paradigms have cognitive psychologists used to study “False memory,” and what are the implications of these choices? Consciousness and Cognition] claim that the majority of research into false memories has been misguided. Specifically, they charge that false memory scientists have been misusing the term “false memory,” relying on the wrong methodologies to study false memories, and misapplying false memory research to real world situations. We review each of these claims (...) and highlight the problems with them. We conclude that several types of false memory research have advanced our knowledge of autobiographical and recovered memories, and that future research will continue to make significant contributions to how we understand memory and memory errors. (shrink)

Engelhardt is correct in thinking that potentiality implies continuity. The central purpose of the Aristotelian notion of potency is to explain continuity, both in becoming and in generation-corruption. If one denies continuity in change, he will have little use for potentiality, at least little use for the Aristotelian types. And there are types that should not be conflated: one to account for continuity in becoming and generation, another to account for continuity of a being going from not acting to acting. (...) The first type, where something happens to a being, is called passive potency; the second type, where a being itself actively does something, is predictably called active potency. (shrink)

v. 1. Esprit philosophique.--v. 2. Esprit révolutionnaire.

In this article, we review and build on intergenerational and behavioral ethics research to consider how the motive to build a lasting legacy can impact ethical behavior in intergenerational decision making. We discuss how people can utilize their relationships toorganizations to craft their legacies. Further, we elucidate how the legacy motive can enhance business ethics, incorporating theory and empirical findings from research on intergenerational decision making, generativity, and terror management theory to develop the legacy construct and to outline the psychological (...) underpinnings of motivations to leave a positive legacy. We discuss the ways in which legacies can provide a link between life-meaning and pro-social motivation, and we consider the ways in which individuals’ social environments can moderate the intensity of the legacy motive and can impact legacy-building behavior by determining the types of legacies that are valued. Finally, we highlight the implications of these ideas for ethical behavior and sustainable decision making in business contexts. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of the Morton Thiokol engineers in the decisions surrounding the launch of the Challenger, particularly with reference to an analysis of this event by Edward Tufte. The engineers at Morton Thiokol recommended against the launch of Challenger because the projected launch temperature between 26°F to 29°F was far outside their field database of successful launches. The engineers had asked for, but not received, data necessary to determine the cause of massive blow-by on the launch the (...) previous January, and they had informed their managers and NASA that continuing flights could be catastrophic if the cause of the problems with the launches was not discovered. The authors conclude that the engineers thus did what they were ethically as well as professionally obligated to do. (shrink)

In an earlier paper on this topic, ‘Eupatridai, Archons, and Areopagus,'3 I was primarily concerned to recover the views of Aristotle, as expressed in the ‘Αθ. πολ., on such elements of Attic Society as Eupatridai, Gennetai, etc. I sought to establish that to him at least these two were not identical: that, more precisely, he recorded two stages of development— ‘Ion’: in whose day the whole body of Athenians was composed of Gennetai, while Eupatridai had not yet been created. ‘Theseus’: (...) who created the Eupatridai—distinguishing them, as a Third Estate, from those two Estates which had hitherto, since Ion, composed the body of Athenians. (shrink)

Although epistasis is at the center of the Fisher-Wright debate, biologists not involved in the controversy are often unaware that there are actually two different formal definitions of epistasis. We compare concepts of genetic independence in the two theoretical traditions of evolutionary genetics, population genetics and quantitative genetics, and show how independence of gene action (represented by the multiplicative model of population genetics) can be different from the absence of gene interaction (represented by the linear additive model of quantitative genetics). (...) The two formulations converge with weak selection but not with strong selection or, for multiple loci, when the aggregated interaction terms are not negligible. As a result of the different formulations of gene interaction, the presence or absence of linkage disequilibrium,/D/, does not necessarily indicate the presence or absence of fitness epistasis. Indeed, linkage disequilibrium is generated in ‘additive’ models in quantitative genetics whenever two (or more) loci experience simultaneous selection. As a research strategy, it is often practical, for theoretical or experimental reasons, to minimize gene interaction by assuming independence of gene action in regard to fitness, or by assuming linear additive effects of multiple loci on a phenotype. However, minimizing the role of epistasis in theoretical investigations hinders our understanding of the origins of diversity and the evolution of complex phenotypes. (shrink)

An understanding of the ethical problems that have arisen in the funding of scientific research at universities requires some attention to doctrines that have traditionally been held about science itself. Such doctrines, we hope to show, are themselves central to many of these ethical problems. It is often thought that the questions examined by scientists, and the theories that guide scientific research, are chosen for uniquely scientific reasons, independently of extra-scientific questions of value or merit. We shall argue that this (...) is an illusion. It is an illusion to think, especially in the present era, that science can even have a coherent direction apart from extra-scientific considerations. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to put forward the hypothesis that the author of ‘Herodes περ πολιτας is Kritias. The speech bears Herodes’ name: did Herodes' well-known interest in Kritias amount to the transcription of a whole speech? The speech concerns Thessalian affairs at approximately the time when Kritias was in Thessaly: is it exactly the time? and is the tone what we would expect Kritias' tone to be? We have much description of Kritias' prose style, and a few (...) verbatim fragments: does the style of this speech correspond? (shrink)

The brief, practical texts in the Essentials of Qualitative Methods series introduce social science and psychology researchers to key approaches to capturing phenomena not easily measured quantitatively, offering exciting, nimble opportunities to gather in-depth qualitative data. In this book, Scott D. Churchill introduces readers to existential phenomenological research, an approach that seeks an in-depth, embodied understanding of subjective human existence that reflects a person's values, purposes, ideals, intentions, emotions, and relationships. This method helps researchers understand the lives and needs (...) of others by helping identify and set aside theoretical and ideological prejudgments. About the Essentials of Qualitative Methods book series: Even for experienced researchers, selecting and correctly applying the right method can be challenging. In this groundbreaking series, leading experts in qualitative methods provide clear, crisp, and comprehensive descriptions of their approach, including its methodological integrity, and its benefits and limitations. Each book includes numerous examples to enable readers to quickly and thoroughly grasp how to leverage these valuable methods. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:102. ONE CONSEQUENCE OF HUME'S NOMINALISM It is commonly assumed, and sometimes argued, that Hume held the Uniformity Thesis regarding causation : something, a, is the cause of something else, b, if and only if when a occurs, b occurs contiguous with and successive to a and whenever anything relevantly similar to a, "no matter where or when, observed or unobserved," something relevantly similar to b occurs. Everyone knows (...) that Hume denies there is any necessary connection between a cause and its effect. Since the invariability of conjunctions of causes and effects follows from their necessary connection and its possibility is not affected by the denial of that conjunction, the Uniformity Thesis seems a plausible retrenchment. Besides, we should deny that a causes b were any similar a to occur without the occurrence of a similar b. So the assumption of the Uniformity Thesis seems natural. When the issue is argued on textual grounds, the appeal is to Hume's first definition of cause at the end of his long analysis of causation. A cause is An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter (T 170). This is construed as Hume's real definition of the causal relation and taken to state the Uniformity Thesis. Both the argument and the assumption presuppose that Hume was concerned with the conditions for something 's being a cause. But, I wish to argue, in the Treatise at any rate Kume was concerned not with causal relations, but with causal judgments. He was 103. concerned with what must be true for us to call or judge a a cause and, only as a consequence of that concern, with what is true of a for a to be a cause. We must take seriously his asking us to cast our eye on any two objects, which we call cause and effect (T 75, my emphasis), and his saying, after introducing constant conjunction, that contiguity and succession are not sufficient to make us pronounce any two objects to be cause and effect, unless we perceive, that these two relations are preserv'd in several instances (T 87, my emphasis). To determine the conditions for causal judgments, one must determine what we observe of a cause, but in making that determination, I am claiming, Hume is not addressing the question he is commonly assumed to have answered. Making that claim plausible requires a detailed analysis of what Hume is about when he gives two 4 definitions of the causal relation and an explication of how what he does in regard to causal judgments fits the paradigm of analysis for judgments in the 17th and 18th centuries, viz. that given by Boyle, Locke, and --- 5 others of such judgments as "That ball is red^" I shall do neither here. I wish to concern myself with another point which is not necessary to make my claim plausible, but would help were it true. I shall develop this point informally, for it is prima facie implausible and I would like to see how it fares unadorned. If it fares well, there will be time enough to deck it out in symbols. The point is that for Hume one literally cannot think the Uniformity Thesis. If this is true, it would certainly help my claim, for it would not help Hume to claim of him that he answers a question with what for him cannot even be thought. But it is certainly an implausible point prima facie. We can think it. Why can't Hume? The answer lies with his 104. nominalism. Hume holds that everything that exists in nature is individual (T 19) and that this is true of- ideas as well as of anything else that exists (T 19-20). Thus, when someone says, "Smoking causes cancer," then, if we understand what is being said and if anything comes to mind, what must come to mind according to those who hold the Uniformity Thesis is a particular instance of smoking, a, and a particular instance of cancer, b, and particular instances of the relations of... (shrink)

As a preliminary to an estimate of the work of Kleisthenes, I have sought in this paper to constate certain facts about the nature of the evidence.

The Spartan Rhetra quoted by Plutarch in Lyc. vi. 2 consists of some thirty-seven words in an archaic Dorian or near-Dorian dialect: Plutarch says it was an oracle, and that later an extra clause was added by the kings Polydoros and Theopompos; he quotes this ‘added clause’ in vi. 8. I believe this Rhetra was not an oracle but an act of the Spartan Ekklesia; and I suspect that the ‘added clause’ was not added, but is an integral part of (...) the original act. But for our first objective this opinion matters less than Plutarch's opinion. Our first objective must be to recover Plutarch's text : and to do that, we must understand his interpretation. (shrink)

The present essay tries to address certain questions arising from the conjunction of biological and political issues by entering into the debate surrounding what Nicolas Agar has called “liberal eugenics.”1 The advocates of liberal eugenics argue for the moral validity of both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ eugenics: genetic interventions which target the prevention of diseases are ‘negative’ while ‘positive’ interventions ‘enhance’ the hereditary capacities of future persons. But is there a necessary contradiction, or at least pronounced tension, between the liberal eugenicist’s (...) emphasis on parental choice in the realm of genetic decision-makingand liberal principles, such as pluralism and autonomy? If so, why? In this paper, I examine Agar’s defense of liberal eugenics. I then discuss the criticisms raised by Jurgen Habermas in “The Debate on the Ethical Self-Understanding of the Species,” concluding that it is necessary to pursue a cautious strategy in the utilization of genetic technologies. (shrink)

More than 10,000 people have died in the Japanese tsunami, and the survivors are cold and hungry. But the media concentrate on nuclear radiation from which no one has died—and is unlikely to. Nuclear radiation at very high levels is dangerous, but the scale of concern that it evokes is misplaced. Nuclear technology cures countless cancer patients everyday—and a radiation dose given for radiotherapy in hospital is no different in principle to a similar dose received in the environment. What of (...) Three Mile Island? There were no known deaths there. And Chernobyl? The most recent UN report confirms the known death toll—28 fatalities among emergency workers plus 15 fatal cases of child thyroid cancer—which would have been avoided if iodine tablets had been taken. And in each case, the numbers are minute compared with the 3,800 people at Bhopal in 1984 who died as a result of a leak of chemicals from the Union Carbide pesticide plant. (shrink)

The old story and the new story -- Have we changed the story? part 1 -- Have we changed the story? part 2 -- Why do we need the new story? -- Some questions in the new story -- Navigating the stories -- Boats and airplanes : a brief digression -- Three questions about God -- Is God angry? -- Is God angry? part 2 -- A small digression about judgment -- Is God distant? part 1 -- Is God distant? (...) part 2 -- Is God distant? part 3 -- Is God distant? part 4 -- Is God a bully? part 1 -- Is God a bully? part 2 -- Is God a bully? part 3 -- A short word on exclusivity -- The path of wisdom -- The eclipse of doctrine -- Ethos versus doctrine -- Where to begin? (shrink)

Nike. McDonald’s Apple. These companies and many others invest millions of dollars each year protecting that one thing that distinguishes them in the marketplace – a trademark. A company’s trademark is the symbol that allows consumers to know that they are dealing with a particular company. This article addresses the extent to which some companies will go to obtain and protect a trademark. Specifically, it will address the fight between Cisco and Apple over the iPhone trademark, as both companies took (...) questionable steps in the United States and abroad to obtain rights to the iPhone mark. In addition, the basics of trademark law and ethical theories relevant to trademark law will be addressed. (shrink)

This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.

In a parallel truism, everyone alive in the year 2200 AD will be able to trace his or her lineal ancestry to a parental stock in the year 200 AD. This book ...

This work reveals the key transformative processes embedded within the yogic tradition.

SIRI read with interest the recent articles by “Lee Elder”1 and O Muramoto,2 along with the accompanying editorial3 about the treatment of ….

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 749-752, December 2011.

Nanotechnology is developing far faster than our understanding of its effects. This lapping of our understanding by speedy development is typical of new technologies, and in the United States we let development occur, introducing new artifacts into the world, without any serious attempt to understand beforehand their effects, long-term or short-term. We have been willing to pay the price of pushing the technological envelope, but pushing the nanotechnological envelope has some special risks, requiring more caution.

Conventional models for Social Construction of Technology fail to take into account the prevailing influence of a new technological/social phenomenon-the modern business corporation. Corporate autonomy, power and influence, as exhibited especially since the mid-1970s, has made necessary the consideration of a new concept: the Technological Construction of Society, a novel form of technological determinism which pays due attention to the role of large, publicly-traded, professionally managed business corporations.

In advocating an extreme form of specification requiring the abolition of separate senses, Stoffregen & Bardy run the risk of diverting attention from the multisensory integration of perception and action they wish to champion.

The author has had a lifelong interest in design and its application. In this book he shows how the perceptions about the nature of the universe inform the art of their times, for example the form and fluidity of primitive art or the crystalline order of Islamic patterns.